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NOTES AND COMMENTS
BREACH OF A CONTRACT TO SELL LAND
IN CALIFORNIA-THE BUYER
WITHOUT A REMEDY
Traditionally the purchaser in a land sale contract has been
well protected. If the vendor breached his agreement to convey, the
purchaser could either bring an action for specific performance of
the contract in equity, or an action at law for damages. If he elected
the equitable remedy, he would receive the specific land he had con-
tracted to purchase. If he chose instead an action at law for damages
he could normally recover the loss of his bargain if the value of the
land was greater than the contract purchase price.' In California
however, it appears that in certain factual situations an injured
purchaser may have neither of the above remedies available to him.2
The California rule regarding damages recoverable when a
vendor breaches an agreement to convey real property is set out
in Civil Code Section 3306. This section denies the purchaser in a
land sale contract the benefit of his bargain unless the vendor acts
in "bad faith" in breaching his agreement. Not only does this section
limit the recovery of the purchaser, it also places the burden of
proof on the purchaser to show that the vendor has acted in "bad
faith," if the purchaser desires to avoid its limiting effect.4
The California rule regarding specific performance is limited
by Section 3391 of the Civil Code which provides that specific per-
formance cannot be enforced against a party to a contract if he has
not received an adequate consideration for the contract. Not only
are the purchaser's rights so limited, but there is also an affirmative
burden placed upon him. He must both allege and prove that the con-
sideration for the contract is the "fair and reasonable value of the
property at the time the agreement was entered into."5
I MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 177 et seq. (1935); 2 SUTHFRLAND, DAMAGES § 579
(4th ed. 1916).
2 See e.g., Gilbert v. Mercer, 179 Cal. App. 2d 29, 3 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1960); and
Rose v. Lawton, 215 Cal. App. 2d 18, 29 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1963), discussed infra.
3 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3306 which reads: ". . . The detriment caused by the breach
of an agreement to convey an estate in real property, is deemed to be the price paid,
and the expenses properly incurred in examining the title and preparing the necessary
papers, with interest thereon; but adding thereto, in the case of bad faith, the difference
between the price agreed to be paid and the value of the estate agreed to be conveyed,
at the time of the breach, and the expenses properly incurred in preparing to enter
upon the land."
4 Wilson v. Rosenkranz, 112 Cal. App. 511, 297 Pac. 44 (1931).
5 Baran v. Goldberg, 86 Cal. App. 2d 506, 194 P.2d 765 (1948) ; Lucientes v. Bliss,
157 Cal. App. 2d 565, 321 P.2d 526 (1958).
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THE PROBLEM
A contracts to purchase B's home for $10,000. The market value
of the property at the time is $12,000 but for some reason B is
forced to sell his home. Before time for performance of the contract,
B finds that he no longer has to sell and desires to repudiate the
contract and retain his home. In this situation Civil Code Sections
3306 and 3391 raise the following question: Is it "bad faith" for B
to refuse to convey if he asserts the equitable defense of inadequacy
of consideration? If this is not a "bad faith" refusal, any vendor,
upon discovering that he has made a bad bargain, can disavow his
contract with impunity, answerable only for that part of the price
he has received and the expenses properly incurred by the purchaser
in examining the title and preparing the necessary papers. In effect,
any vendor making a "bad deal" is not bound by it.
The case of Mercer v. Lemmens6 seems to offer the solution to
this problem. In this case plaintiff purchased a parcel of land from
defendant in 1955. The deposit receipt provided that defendant
would give plaintiff first opportunity to purchase, for $10,000, an
adjoining fifty foot lot owned by defendant. Six years later defendant
contracted to sell the adjoining lot to a third party for $22,000. The
plaintiff then attempted to assert his right of first refusal. Defendant
denied the claimed right and plaintiff brought suit for specific per-
formance and damages for breach of contract. The trial court
awarded plaintiff $12,000 damages-the loss of his bargain. The
District Court of Appeals upheld this decision saying:
The trial court found that defendant deliberately refused to perform his
agreement with plaintiffs because he could sell to better advantage to
others and without just cause, and that such refusal to perform was in
bad faith. Accordingly, the allowance of the $12,000 difference between
the preemptive price and the market value of the property was properly
awarded as damages.7
The District Court of Appeals relied on the case of Kahn v.
Lischners wherein the defendant-vendor sold his land in order to
obtain a higher price. This was found to be in "bad faith" on his
part. It was held that:
The trial court was justified in finding that appellant terminated his
contract with respondent because he had made a bad bargain and saw
an opportunity to make a better deal .... Bad faith of appellant having
been found by the trial court, it was proper to assess damages pursuant
to Civil Code, section 3306. .... 9
6 230 A.C.A. 175, 40 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1964).
7 Id. at 181, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
8 128 Cal. App. 2d 480, 275 P.2d 539 (1954).
9 Id. at 490, 275 P.2d at 545.
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
These two cases establish the rule that one who has made a bad
bargain cannot plead that bad bargain as a defense in a suit for
damages.
CONFLICTING CASES
Two recent decisions deal directly with this problem and reach
a result contrary to the Mercer and Kakn cases. In Gilbert v.
Mercer' appellant contracted with respondents to purchase sixty-
five acres of land for $325. Respondents later repudiated the contract
whereupon appellant brought an action for specific performance
and damages. The trial court found that the consideration was not
the "fair and reasonable value of the property at the time the agree-
ment was entered into," and refused to grant either specific per-
formance or damages. This finding was affirmed on appeal, the
District Court of Appeals stating:
... Since the finding of inadequacy of consideration alone will support
the judgment for the defendants, this court deems it unnecessary to
consider other findings or matters as to evidence which have no relation
to and cannot affect that finding .... Plaintiff was not entitled to dam-
ages. Such relief is incidental to a decree of specific performance and
cannot be given where no cause of action for specific performance is
established."
In Rose v. Lawton12 there was an action for specific performance
of a land sale contract and for damages for failure to perform the
agreement. The purchaser had obtained a default judgment for
specific performance. On appeal the judgment ordering specific
performance was reversed because the purchaser had failed to
allege that appellant had received an adequate consideration for
the contract. The judgment awarding damages was also reversed in
reliance on the Gilbert case and California Jurisprudence 2d.1'
In both the Rose and Gilbert decisions the plaintiffs were not
entitled to specific performance of a contract for the sale of land
because they failed to allege or prove that the consideration named
in the agreement was the fair and reasonable value of the property
as required by Civil Code Section 3391. Their failure to establish
a claim for specific performance was the basis for denying damages
under Civil Code Section 3306. It appears that these cases establish
a rule that unless one can establish his right to specific performance
he has no right to damages. It would appear that a vendor can
escape the loss of bargain measure of damages in California by
10 179 Cal. App. 2d 29, 3 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1960).
11 Id. at 31, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 457, 458.
12 215 Cal. App. 2d 18, 29 Cal. Rptr. 844 (1963).
Is 45 CAL. JUR. 2d Specific Performance § 85 (1958). This point will be discussed
more fully infra.
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asserting the defense of inadequacy of consideration in a suit by
the purchaser for specific performance.' 4
THE IMPORTANCE OF PLEADING
There is a difference, however, in the Gilbert and Rose cases
which may distinguish them from the decisions in Kahn and Mercer.
This difference is in the type of action brought. In the Kahn and
Mercer cases the plaintiffs were suing for damages for breach of
contract, whereas in Gilbert and Rose the actions were for specific
performance, and for damages. Nevertheless, this difference in the
form of action should not necessitate such contrary results, especially
in a code pleading state such as California. In states with separate
systems of law and equity, the right to an award of damages by a
court of equity depends upon establishing a right to equitable relief.' 5
In code states, on the other hand, it has been said:
Nothing can be plainer or more certain than that a primary purpose of
the Code was to combine legal and equitable remedies between the
parties to any controversy so that complete relief, legal and equitable
should be given in a single action .... Thus, in an action for specific
performance, if it is established on the trial that specific relief cannot
be given, the plaintiff may recover damages. 16
Furthermore, in Zellner v. Wassman"7 the court said:
There being but one form of civil action in this state, a plaintiff may
recover if his complaint "states any cause of action entitling the
plaintiff to any relief at law or in equity." . . . It is not essential that
a complaint state a cause of action for the relief which plaintiff seeks,
provided the facts stated show some right of recovery, and a party
cannot be thrown out of court merely because he may have miscon-
ceived the form of relief to which he is entitled.'8
Also, in Long Beach Drug Co. v. United Drug Co. 9 it is said that
even if an equitable remedy cannot be had, if the contract is valid in
other respects, the court should allow the complaint to be amended
to seek damages even though it was not originally framed in the
14 This, of course, is contrary to the generally accepted reason for loss of bargain
damages. McCoRmiCK, DAMAGES § 179 (1935) deals with this problem directly and
reaches a contrary result. It is said there: "If the vendor, as frequently happens, on
scenting a new and more profitable bargain, conveys the land to another purchaser or
otherwise disables himself from performing, or if when the time comes to complete the
contract he willfully refuses, these are clear cases of bad faith, and render the vendor
liable for loss of the bargain."
15 WALSH, EQurrY § 22 (1930).
16 Ibid.
17 184 Cal. 80, 193 Pac. 84 (1920).
18 Id. at 87, 88, 193 Pac. at 87. (Emphasis added.)
19 13 Cal. 2d 158, 88 P.2d 698 (1939).
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alternative. In view of the above cases any attempt to distinguish
Gilbert and Rose on the form of their pleadings is not valid.
It is submitted therefore, that Gilbert and Rose represent a mis-
application of a law which has been expressly overruled by the
California Supreme Court. The misapplication arises in holding that
the damages allowable under Civil Code Section 3306 are incidental
to a decree of specific performance. Section 3306 specifies that
damages recoverable for breach of contract are in lieu of specific
performance." The primary case relied upon in the Gilbert and Rose
decisions dealt directly with this point.2 1 In that case appellants
alleged that respondent's failure to comply with the terms of a land
sale contract was in bad faith. They sought damages under Civil
Code Section 3306. The District Court of Appeals said:
The trial judge disallowed damages for the reason, as stated in his oral
decision, that since plaintiffs were not entitled to specific performance
they were not entitled to damages. He relied upon the case of Hupp v.
Lawler 106 C.A. 121 .... The decision therein, regarding that point,
was based upon the case of Morgan v. Dibble 43 C.A. 116 .... The
Supreme Court held to the contrary in the case of Pascoe v. Morrison
219 Cal. 54, . . . the court said . . . "while the equitable relief will be
denied in such a case, now the action will be retained and the issue as to
breach of contract and damages will be sent to a jury for trial .... In
addition thereto the facts as pleaded, without reference to any question
of specific performance, entitled plaintiff to damages; and, as shown by
the cases heretofore cited, the court was not only authorized, but it was
its duty to grant such relief as the evidence warranted." It appears
therefore that the decision in the case of Hupp v. Lawler, supra, upon
which the trial judge relied, is not in accord with several other cases.
The mere fact that plaintiffs were not entitled to specific performance
did not preclude them from recovering damages for breach of con-
tract.
22
The court went on to point out that damages which were merely
incidental to a decree of specific performance could not be awarded.
It was, however, careful to distinguish these damages from damages
for breach of contract which could be awarded. As indicated earlier,23
the court in Gilbert also cited California Jurisprudence 2d, ap-
parently relying on this statement:
An action to recover damages in lieu of specific performance lies not at
law, but in equity, for the right thereto depends on the right to specific
performance, and is not available until the latter is established. 24
20 Baran v. Goldberg, supra note 5. In 22 CAL. LAW REV. 208 this exact point is
dealt with at great length and the same conclusion is reached.
21 86 Cal. App. 2d 506, 194 P.2d 765 (1948).
22 Id. at 510, 511, 194 P.2d at 768. (Emphasis added.)
28 45 CAL. JUR. 2d Specific Performance § 85 (1958).
24 Id. at 377. As authority for this point the case of Hupp v. Lawler, 106 Cal.
App. 121, 288 Pac. 801 is cited. It should be noted that in the Baran case the District
[Vol. 5
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However, a further reading in this same section reveals this propo-
sition:
Also, in a case where specific performance is not available because the
party refusing to perform has not received adequate consideration, and
the contract is not just and reasonable, the plaintiff is not prevented
from recovering damages for breach of contract, at least if some cause
of action is made out showing that damages on that theory may be
allowable.2 5
And it is also pointed out that Civil Code Section 3306 provides for
damages which are recoverable in lieu of specific performance, hence
not incidental thereto. 6
PROOF OF BAD FAITH
The key to recovering the loss of bargain measure of damages
under Section 3306 is to prove that the vendor acted in bad faith in
breaching his contract. Therefore a study of the origin and nature
of the rule embodied in Section 3306 is important in determining
what a purchaser must do in order to prove bad faith.27
The so called good faith rule embodied in Section 3306 comes
from the English decision of Flureau v. Thornhill.2s This case held
that where a seller of land failed to complete the contract because
of defective title, damages for loss of his bargain were not recoverable
by the purchaser unless the seller was guilty of fraud. The House
of Lords strengthened this rule in Bain v. Fothergill.29 The rationale
for this rule is that there is always a degree of uncertainty as to
whether good title could effectively be conveyed by the vendor, and a
purchaser contracting with this knowledge should not be allowed
to recover some fanciful loss of bargain if the vendor was incapable
of completing his contract because of his defective title 0
However, this restriction is not followed in California. Here,
it has been established that a deliberate refusal, without just cause
or excuse, to perform a valid contract for the sale of real property
Court of Appeals was very explicit in pointing out that Hupp had been expressly
overruled by the State Supreme Court in Pascoe v. Morrison. See note 19 supra.
25 45 CAL. JUR. 2d Specific Performance § 85, p. 378.
26 Id. at 379.
27 There is an interesting and enlightening discussion of this point in 20 Kr. L.J.
304 (1932).
28 2 Wm Bl. 1078, 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (1776). Here the vendor was unable to com-
plete his contract to convey an interest in land because of a defect in his title of which
he had no knowledge at the time of contracting.
2 (1874) L.R. 7 H.L. (Ir.). In this case the seller knew at the time of contracting
that he did not have a marketable title. However, it was his good faith belief that the
defect would be cured by the time he was bound to convey. His belief turned out to be
mistaken.
30 Id. at 210, 211.
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constitutes bad faith within the meaning of the Section 3306."' This
suggests two questions; what is a just cause or excuse, and what is a
valid contract.
Just cause or excuse in refusing to perform is normally a fact
question to be resolved by a jury.32 However, where reasonable men
could not differ there is no jury question. The law is clear that mere
inadequacy of consideration, however gross, is never a sufficient
ground for avoiding contractual obligations,3 and that a transaction
will not be deemed fraudulent merely because the party complaining
made a bad bargain."4 Furthermore, the mere fact that a contract
is not specifically enforceable does not render it either void or void-
able. 3 Therefore it would seem proper for a court to rule as a matter
of law that a refusal to convey, alleging only inadequacy of considera-
tion, is not a just cause or excuse. If this is not a just cause or
excuse, it should follow that a refusal based on these grounds con-
stitutes bad faith, entitling the purchaser to claim loss of bargain
as his measure of the damages.3"
CONCLUSION
From an examination of the authorities in this general area it
is clear that in a suit for specific performance, the equitable defense
of inadequacy of consideration allowed by Civil Code Section 3391
should not have any effect on the measure of damages that may be
recovered by the purchaser in a land sale contract under Civil Code
Section 3306. Furthermore, if the purchaser alleges and proves
facts that entitle him to damages, the court must grant the relief
warranted by the evidence even though such relief is not requested
in specific language.
If a vendor wishes to bring himself outside the bad faith quali-
fication, he must show some additional cause or excuse for his default.
Because the California Supreme Court has not ruled directly upon
this issue, it is this writer's opinion that the Mercer case re-estab-
31 Johnson v. Goldberg, 130 Cal. App. 2d 571, 279 P.2d 131 (1955); Eastwood
Homes Inc. v. Hudson, 161 Cal. App. 2d 532, 379 P.2d 29 (1958); Kahn v. Lischner,
128 Cal. App. 2d 480, 275 P.2d 539 (1954) ; Rasmussen v. Moe, 138 Cal. App. 2d 499,
292 P.2d 226 (1956).
32 Hamaker v. Bryan, 178 Cal. 128, 172 Pac. 391 (1918); Johnson v. Goldberg,
130 Cal. App. 2d 531, 279 P.2d 131 (1955).
33 Sargent v. Shomaker, 193 Cal. 122, 223 Pac. 464 (1924); Costello v. Central
Eureka Mining Co., 85 Cal. App. 2d 772, 193 P.2d 968 (1948).
34 Jones v. Re-Mine Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 2d 832, 119 P.2d 219 (1941); Kahn v.
Lischner, 128 Cal. App. 2d 480, 275 P.2d 539 (1954).
35 Morris v. Lilly, 147 Cal. 754, 82 Pac. 475 (1905) ; Desert Seed Co. v. Barbus,
66 Cal. App. 2d 838, 153 P.2d 184 (1944).
36 See e.g., Strait v. Wilkins, 16 Cal. App. 188, 116 Pac. 685 (1911); Konda v.
Fay, 22 Cal. App. 722, 136 Pac. 514 (1913).
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lishes the sound law in this area. The Gilbert and Rose decisions are
erroneous deviations from the established law, and their adoption
would seem to encourage speculation, deceit, fraud, perjury and
other pernicious practices, all of which the holding in Mercer avoids.
Gary Priest
